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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 7, 2010, Los Angeles law enforcement arrested Lonnie 
Franklin, known colloquially as the Grim Sleeper, for the deaths of ten 
women in the Los Angeles area dating back to the mid-1980s.1 In the Grim 
Sleeper case, law enforcement widened the parameters within the FBI’s 
 
 1  Greg Miller, Scientists Explain How Familial DNA Testing Nabbed Alleged Serial Killer, SCI. 
(Jul. 12, 2010, 1:18 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2010/07/scientists-explain-how-familial-
dna-testing-nabbed-alleged-serial-killer# [https://perma.cc/577A-JZ2U]. 
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Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to find a familial match with 
Franklin’s son who had been arrested years prior on unrelated charges.2 
The practice of widening the parameters of CODIS to find partial and 
familial matches to cold cases and other investigations was approved by the 
FBI in 2008, and has since been explicitly adopted by twelve states.3 
Familial DNA searching within CODIS is not new, but consumer 
DNA testing products like 23andMe4 are poised to offer a powerful new 
tool in crime fighting.5 Today, consumer DNA databases are on track to 
host 100 million samples in the next two years.6 AncestryDNA sold over 
$1.5 million worth of test kits in 2017 on Black Friday alone.7 Unlike 
CODIS, the companies’ individual privacy policies regulate access to these 
databases. Without any government oversight, the rise of private consumer 
genealogy databases in recent years has provided law enforcement with the 
ability to search these databases for matches to cold case DNA that has 
been sitting in evidence rooms for decades. While law enforcement is 
rarely granted access to search privately owned consumer DNA databases, 
consumers retain the right to download their DNA profiles from these 
private databases and upload them into public databases in search of family 
relations. These databases are free to use and allow individuals to volunteer 
their genetic information to find familial connections. They also allow 
individuals to affirmatively opt-in to use their DNA samples in fighting 
crime.8 Since 2018, these consumer databases have led to the arrests of 
nearly three dozen people for violent crimes and cold cases.9 In every case, 
those charged with a crime never actually uploaded their own genetic 
 
 2  See id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  23AndMe is a personal genomics and biotechnology company best known for providing direct-
to-consumer genetic testing in which consumers provide a saliva sample that is analyzed in a lab. Other 
popular databases include Ancestry.com and FamilyTreeDNA.com. See generally ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/ [https://perma.cc/7XLP-2DYK] (Ancestry.com is a DNA test service 
provider); FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/ [https://perma.cc/7XLP-2DYK] 
(FamilyTreeDNA is a DNA test service provider). 
 5  See Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test, 
MIT TECH. REV.: BIOTECH. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-
26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/ [https://perma.cc/NX3Y-N7JM]. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Megan Molteni, Ancestry’s Genetic Testing Kits Are Heading for Your Stocking This Year, 
WIRED: SCI. (Dec. 01, 2017, 07:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ancestrys-genetic-testing-kits-
are-heading-for-your-stocking-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/5CZS-9J66]. 
 8  See Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site that Helped Catch the Golden State Killer is Grappling 
with Privacy, SLATE (May 29, 2019, 07:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dna-
privacy-update-law-enforcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html [https://perma.cc/E5HZ-75CA]. 
 9  Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE, (Mar. 19, 
2019, 07:30 AM) https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-law-enforcement-
genetic-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/293W-UFXA]. 
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profiles to any database.10 Rather, they were identified through the DNA 
samples of distant relatives who shared their genetic information on these 
consumer platforms.11 
As more and more people upload their DNA into these public 
databases, their use in crime fighting becomes that much more potent. In 
one estimate, 60% of Americans from European descent are already 
identifiable through these familial DNA searches.12 With at least one court 
already approving warrants that override private consumer DNA database 
privacy policies, legislative remedies will be critical to regulating how law 
enforcement uses these databases for fighting crime.13 In particular, the 
warrantless search of these databases to apprehend criminals has raised 
constitutional concerns around the Fourth Amendment and genetic privacy. 
While the individuals who submit their DNA to these databases 
affirmatively volunteer their information, limiting their reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine, the criminals 
themselves do not affirmatively volunteer their information. This Note will 
examine the current status of Fourth Amendment case law as it relates to 
both Boyd’s property doctrine and the third-party doctrine to determine 
how courts will likely treat forensic genetic genealogical DNA testing in 
the future. Ultimately, I argue that criminal investigations using genetic 
genealogical DNA testing are not protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
However, the practice of extracting DNA from a suspect’s abandoned 
property after conducting genetic genealogical searches may offer an 
avenue for Fourth Amendment protection. 
II. TRADITIONAL DNA DATABASE SEARCH VERSUS FAMILIAL DNA 
SEARCHES 
A. CODIS and NDIS 
Traditional DNA searches in criminal investigations analyze DNA 
collected at crime scenes and find exact matches within both state and 
federally run DNA databases.14 These databases collect DNA samples from 
crime scenes, felons, and arrestees.15 CODIS is the overarching system and 
 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  See Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just said 
Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-
search-warrant.html [http://perma.cc/Z7CC-HLB7]. 
 14  Familial DNA Searches, FINDLAW (Feb. 6, 2019), https://findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-
rights/familial-dna-searches.html [http://perma.cc/9GJN-73E3]. 
 15  See id. 
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database run by the FBI.16 Within that system is the National DNA Index 
System (NDIS) that is comprised of DNA profiles contributed by federal, 
state, and local participating forensic laboratories.17 When a suspected 
sample of the unknown perpetrator’s DNA is collected, the sample is first 
submitted to the CODIS system. CODIS compares this sample against state 
databases of convicted offender and arrestee profiles.18 
While the majority of the human genome is identical across all 
individuals, science has identified areas of variation, known as short 
tandem repeats (STRs), that contain repeating units of short three to four 
nucleotide DNA sequences.19 In forensic DNA typing, between thirteen and 
twenty STRs are compared between the reference sample and the forensic 
sample.20 In order to make a match, the lab must match the allele profile of 
thirteen core STRs for both the evidence and the suspect’s sample. If a 
match is found, the lab will confirm the match and obtain the identity of the 
matching profile.21 The DNA profile is also searched in the state’s forensic 
index of unknown DNA samples collected at other crime scenes.22 This 
way, a potential match can be linked to multiple crimes.23 The system 
allows investigators to identify criminals, link serial violent crimes 
together, and even help identify missing and unidentified individuals.24 
Following the DNA Identification Act of 1994, all fifty states also 
participate in NDIS.25 This means that DNA submitted to CODIS will be 
searched at both the state and national level.26 As of September 2019, the 
NDIS contained 13,973,206 offender profiles, 3,721,360 arrestee profiles, 
and 973,108 forensic profiles.27 Additionally, CODIS has produced over 
 
 16  Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet 
[http://perma.cc/RHK3-JR5J]. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Karen Norrgard, Forensics, DNA Fingerprinting, and CODIS, NATURE EDUC. (2008), 
https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/forensics-dna-fingerprinting-and-codis-736/ 
[http://perma.cc/6KBX-UME2]. 
 20  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and 
Searching (Sep. 2, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download 
[http://perma.cc/Z7CC-HLB7]. 
 21  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 16. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Combined DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/QL63-L28Z]. 
 25  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 16. 
 26  Id. 
 27  See CODIS – NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics 
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485,063 hits assisting in more than 474,576 investigations.28 No names or 
other personal identifiers are stored on CODIS.29 CODIS also removes 
sensitive or biomedically relevant information from samples located within 
the database.30 
Familial DNA search expands the typical search parameters in CODIS 
to search for partial DNA matches on the theory that a partial match signals 
a close blood relative.31 Instead of looking at STRs, the lab will analyze 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in genetic genealogical search.32 
SNPs span the entirety of the human genome as opposed to just one section 
in STR testing. SNPs are analyzed instead of STRs because SNPs allow 
scientists to identify shared blocks of DNA in larger blocks. The closer the 
family relations are, the longer the shared SNP blocks; the more distant the 
relations become, the shorter the shared SNP blocks. 
III. THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL DNA DATABASES 
A. Demographics 
Familial DNA searching using consumer genetic databases is an 
investigative tool that is entirely separate from the FBI CODIS system.33 
Known as forensic genetic genealogy, these commercial databases are used 
primarily as a way for private citizens to learn more about their own 
genetic profiles and connect with distant relatives.34 These commercial 
DNA databases have exploded in popularity over the last few years, with 
more than 26 million consumers volunteering their DNA to four leading 
commercial ancestry and health databases.35 It is now estimated that one in 
twenty-five Americans now have access to their genetic data.36 Some 
experts anticipate more than 100 million individuals will submit their DNA 
to private databases in the next two years.37 The vast majority (nearly 80%) 
of individuals buying consumer DNA kits are Americans of European 
 
[https://perma.cc/8YWX-J38Y] (Offender profiles relate to individuals currently and previously 
incarcerated, arrestee profiles relate to individuals who have been arrested, and forensic profiles relate 
to DNA samples found at crime scenes). 
 28  See id. 
 29  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 16. 
 30  See id. 
 31  See FINDLAW, supra note 14. 
 32  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 16. 
 33  Claire Abrahamson, Guilt by Genetic Association: The Fourth Amendment and the Search of 
Private Genetic Databases by Law Enforcement, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539, 2549 (2019). 
 34  See id. at 2548, 2553. 
 35  Regalado, supra note 5, at 1. 
 36  Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 2548. 
 37  Regalado, supra note 5, at 1. 
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descent.38 Individuals of East Asian descent are the second most prevalent 
at 9%.39 While Americans of European descent dominate the representation 
of commercial DNA kits, people of color are disproportionately 
represented in CODIS comprising over 40% of the database.40 For many 
years, legal experts raised concerns that one racial population’s privacy 
rights might be disparately impacted by DNA search, however, the rise of 
commercial databases has increased law enforcement’s ability to access 
individuals and racial groups outside CODIS, mitigating some concern.41 
B. Scope of the Data Collected 
Private consumer databases capable of testing genetic samples like 
23andMe and Ancestry require a saliva sample.42 The saliva sample is used 
to identify SNPs. SNPs are variations in the DNA sequence responsible for 
genetic differences between people.43 Unlike CODIS, commercial DNA 
kits test for highly personal, often medically sensitive information. 
Variations in the genome can be linked to recreational traits like hair 
curliness, preference for cilantro, as well as serious health risks like late-
onset Alzheimer’s disease.44 The type of data collected by the private 
consumer databases depend on the type of genetic testing the database 
provides.45 Most private consumer databases generally offer two types of 
personal genetic testing: ancestral and medical analyses.46 23andMe offers 
health reports in addition to ancestral insights.47 Currently, it tests for two 
different breast cancer genes as well as a prostate cancer gene.48 Medical 
testing analyzes genetic samples for genetic variants associated with certain 
medical conditions, while ancestral testing analyzes genetic variants to 
provide information on an individual’s ethnic background.49 
 
 38  Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 2549. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Jason Silverstein, The Dark Side of DNA Evidence, THE NATION (April 15, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/dark-side-dna-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/JL34-CCLH]. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 2549. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. at 2549. 
 45  Id. at 2550. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Regalado, supra note 5, at 4. 
 48  Id. at 5. 
 49  Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 2550. 
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C. Privacy Policies 
Unlike CODIS, private databases are not regulated by state or federal 
authorities.50 Some states do regulate genetic testing, but many of these 
policies do not apply to consumer databases which are generally considered 
recreational.51 Additionally, these private consumer databases do not fall 
under the “privacy rule” of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) because the Act typically only applies to 
covered entities such as healthcare providers and insurance companies.52 
Due to this blind spot in regulatory coverage, the individual privacy 
policies of each company governs how the genetic data it collects is used 
and shared. Both 23andMe and Ancestry have policies in place to prevent 
law enforcement from directly accessing the data of their millions of 
customers. For example, 23andMe provides a guide for law enforcement to 
navigate its policy.53 The guide states: 
23andMe chooses to use all practical legal and administrative 
resources to resist requests from law enforcement, and we do not share 
customer data with any public databases, or with entities that may increase 
the risk of law enforcement access. In certain circumstances, however, 
23andMe may be required by law to comply with a valid court order, 
subpoena, or search warrant for genetic or personal information.54 
As of October 2019, only ten requests had been made by law 
enforcement to 23andMe and 23andMe rejected each one.55 The majority of 
the requests concerned credit card fraud.56 Similarly, Ancestry’s privacy 
policy states, “Ancestry does not voluntarily cooperate with law 
enforcement. To provide our Users with the greatest protection under the 
law, we require all government agencies . . . follow a valid legal 
process. . . .”57 Ancestry also provides transparency information in regards to 
the number of requests is has received and responded to.58 According to its 
2018 report, Ancestry received ten valid law enforcement requests for user 
 
 50  Id. at 2551. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/law-
enforcement-guide/ [https://perma.cc/799H-SP5J]. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Transparency Report, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/VT8G-E7H9]. 
 56  Ancestry 2019 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency-
2019 [https://perma.cc/L8XG-ZJE7]. 
 57  Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement 
[https://perma.cc/G4SK-WX2M]. 
 58  Id. 
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information and provided information in response to seven of those ten 
requests.59 Additionally, the requests were limited to offenses regarding 
credit card fraud and identity theft.60 
In response to public outcry after the Golden State Killer case, 
GEDmatch updated its privacy policy to require users to affirmatively “opt-
in” to their DNA being used in criminal investigations.61 This policy 
drastically limited the number of profiles that could be searched; however, 
on November 5, 2019, a Florida judge approved a warrant to penetrate 
GEDmatch’s entire database in a genetic genealogical search.62 This is the 
first time a judge has approved of such a warrant.63 Policy and legal experts 
speculate that this move could generate significant precedent and 
encourage other agencies to seek warrants to search GEDmatch as well as 
private databases such as 23andMe and Ancestry.64 
A warrant permitting the broad-based search of a consumer genetic 
database suggests consumer DNA database privacy policies may be fallible 
after all. Even if the companies wanted to challenge the warrant, according 
to some experts, they may not have legal standing to do so.65 In 2013, 
Facebook challenged a similar warrant on Fourth Amendment grounds and 
was rejected on the basis that Facebook simply stored the data and was not 
the subject of the criminal probe.66 Standing further becomes an issue in 
challenging a warrant like the one in Florida because law enforcement 
rarely expects to get a perfect match from the database search. Police do 
not intend to find a direct match in a familial search. The goal is to identify 
a specific family tree and cross reference the search with other pieces of 
evidence as opposed to finding the suspect himself.67 
 
 59  Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency-
2018 [https://perma.cc/2ZNB-9YRM]. 
 60  Id. 
 61  GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm [https://perma.cc/6JTL-WVF9]. 
 62  Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just said 
Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-
search-warrant.html [https://perma.cc/4MLL-ZXXV]. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Aaron Mak, We May Be Entering a New Era for Using Consumer Genetic Information to Solve 
Crime, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/gedmatch-warrant-dna-ancestry-
23andme.html [https://perma.cc/7MFD-BNBQ]. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
18:311 (May 2021) The Genetic Panopticon 
319 
D. Data Ownership and Third-Party Disclosure 
Both Ancestry and 23andMe explicitly state in their privacy 
statements that users retain ownership of the genetic information gleaned 
from their biological samples.68 However, both sites also retain “the right to 
collect, host, transfer, process, analyze, communicate and store [genetic 
information].”69 Both companies also state that by participating in the 
service, consumers grant the companies “a sublicensable, worldwide, 
royalty-free license to host, store, copy, publish, distribute, provide access 
to, create derivative works of, and otherwise use such User Provided 
Content.”70 In addition to law enforcement, Ancestry and 23andMe may, 
with the consent of the consumer, share data with third parties for the 
purposes of research. “Research” is not specifically defined in the 
agreement. 
Because each individual consumer has an ownership right to his or her 
genetic information, consumers can download their genetic code as raw 
data and upload it to third party platforms of their own choosing. This 
ownership right is stipulated exclusively within consumer DNA kit privacy 
policies and has never been confirmed by the courts. After users download 
their genetic data from the database, their data is no longer protected by the 
database’s privacy policy.71 Many individuals choose to upload their data to 
public databases such as GEDmatch.com.72 DNA located on public 
databases like GEDmatch can be accessed by the general public seeking 
familial connections as well as law enforcement using cold case DNA. 
IV. PUBLIC GENETIC DATABASES 
A. Use in Criminal Investigations 
When law enforcement uses genealogy databases to search for DNA 
matches, it conducts what is known as a “long-range familial search.”73 
These long-range searches use DNA samples to partially match the sample 
 
 68  Ancestry Privacy Statement, ANCESTRY (May 19, 2021), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement [https://perma.cc/9NLX-TKL8]; see also, 
23andMe Privacy Statement, 23ANDME (May 19, 2021), https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YS6-592V]. 
 69  See e.g., Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY (May 10, 2021), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/TermsAndConditions [https://perma.cc/4ESR-4AS3]. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  GEDmatch Get Started – or Get Alternatives, YOUR DNA GUIDE (last visited December 17, 
2019), https://www.yourdnaguide.com/upload-to-gedmatch [https://perma.cc/FRQ4-6MRD]. 
 73  Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 2553. 
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to typically distant relations such as second and third cousins.74 A 2018 
study concluded that “around 60 percent of Americans of European descent 
could be matched to a third cousin or closer relation,” even if they have not 
taken the test.75 Parabon Nanolabs is the most widely recognized forensic 
consulting firm in the world.76 The firm gained its recognition by using 
DNA databases such as GEDmatch to generate leads to crimes and track 
down offenders.77 
GEDmatch is a free, open-source database that allows genealogists to 
compare segments of DNA.78 The segments can be cross-matched with 
family trees and public records to identify distant relations to the source 
DNA.79 GEDmatch users voluntarily upload their raw DNA data (often 
created by sites like 23andMe and Ancestry) and GEDmatch matches their 
data to potential relatives.80 Initially, use of GEDmatch’s database was 
accessible by law enforcement.81 This allowed law enforcement to 
anonymously upload cold case DNA samples and search for matches. The 
landmark example of this technique was in the Golden State Killer case.82 
For decades, the DNA of the suspected Golden State Killer, a criminal 
linked to twelve homicides and forty-five violent rapes between 1976 and 
1986, sat in evidence storage.83 It was not until 2018 when investigators ran 
a DNA sample of the suspected killer through GEDmatch’s public database 
that they got their first break in the case.84 Using GEDmatch, a genetic 
 
 74  Id. 
 75  Brian Resnick, How Your Third Cousin’s Ancestry DNA Test Could Jeopardize Your Privacy, 
VOX (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/10/12/17957268/science-ancestry-dna-privacy [https://perma.cc/C2B4-DPNB]; see also 
The Controversial Company Using DNA to Sketch the Faces of Criminals, NATURE (May 19, 2021), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02545-5 [https://perma.cc/4X2C-33Q7]. 
 76  NATURE, supra note 75. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Resnick, supra note 75; Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To 
Genealogy Database: “I never expected anything like this,” THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695/ 
[https://perma.cc/UGJ9-C6TC]. 
 79  Zhang, supra note 78. 
 80  Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer Case, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/genetic-genealogy-dna-database-criminal-
investigations/599005/ [https://perma.cc/6PWD-M7EQ]. 
 81  NATURE, supra note 75. 
 82  Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the ‘Golden 




 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
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geneaologist hired by law enforcement identified two GEDmatch profiles 
who looked to be distant cousins of the Golden State Killer.85 Using these 
matches, the genealogist constructed a family tree that placed three 
potential suspects in California at the time of the Golden State Killer’s 
crime spree.86 Law enforcement acquired a cigarette discarded by one 
suspect, and it was a match.87 Police arrested Joseph DeAngelo on April 24, 
2018.88 It was the first criminal case to be solved using the technique.89 
Since the capture of the Golden State Killer, GEDmatch has played a 
role in identifying at least thirty-nine additional cold case arrests and 
twelve unidentified remains.90 Parabon NanoLabs has played a critical role 
in assisting law enforcement with genetic genealogical search techniques.91 
Through the company’s genetic genealogy unit, “analysts compare crime 
scene DNA samples against public genetic genealogy databases to narrow 
down a suspect list to a region, a family, or even an individual.”92 Further, 
when this strategy is insufficient, Parabon deploys additional tools to help 
investigators.93 One tool is called “Snapshot DNA Phenotyping” which 
identifies physical attributes (phenotypes) in the unknown DNA sample 
and builds a physical composite from the DNA sample.94 This tool can be 
used to help law enforcement to talk with members of the community in 
target regions with a more accurate physical description.95 The current 
technology can only produce rough pictures good enough to narrow a 
manhunt or eliminate possible suspects.96 The second tool is called the 
 
 85  NATURE, supra note 75. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Message about the Recent Changes at GEDmatch, DNA DOE PROJECT (May 19, 2021) 
https://dnadoeproject.org/message-about-the-recent-changes-at-gedmatch/ [https://perma.cc/63ES-
SFU4]. 
 91  Selk, supra note 82. 
 92  Parabon Announces Snapshot Genetic Genealogy Service for Law Enforcement, PARABON-
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“Snapshot Kinship Inference” service that accurately predicts the 
relationship between two DNA samples and helps investigators include or 
exclude branches of large family trees by testing family members.97 
The use of genetic genealogy searching in law enforcement is still 
relatively new, having never been tested in court until June 2019 in the 
conviction of William Talbott II in the 1987 double murder of a young 
Canadian couple in Washington state.98 The defense never challenged the 
use of genetic genealogy on privacy grounds, nor did it pose a single 
question about the technique.99 Two days into deliberation, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on two counts of homicide.100 In June of 2019, 
Jesse Bjerke was charged with the violent rape of a woman at a pool after 
his DNA was identified through genetic genealogical search.101 Parabon 
Nanolab’s genetic genealogical search matched Bjerke’s DNA to two 
cousins on both sides of his family.102 Using this data, law enforcement 
narrowed their search to Bjerke based on his appearance and his 
whereabouts the time the rape occurred.103 They began tailing him and 
retrieved a straw he used at a restaurant from the garbage. The result was a 
one in 7.2 billion chance the DNA was not his.104 Bjerke would later plead 
guilty to the charge and is still awaiting sentencing.105 
B. Privacy Policies Post-Golden State Killer 
Amidst public outcry over privacy concerns, GEDmatch published a 
new privacy policy requiring users to affirmatively opt-in to allow their 
genetic data to be used in criminal investigations.106 The policy move has 
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from approximately 1.3 million to 160,000.107 In response, competing public 
databases such as FamilyTreeDNA has marketed its database to users as a 
way to help law enforcement catch criminals.108 When the company 
discovered the FBI had been quietly using the site to upload genetic profiles 
from crime scenes, it changed its terms and services to explicitly permit law 
enforcement to use the database in cases of violent crimes without notifying 
its customers.109 Less than 1% of FamilyTreeDNAs users elected to opt out 
of law enforcement after one week of the policy being in place.110 
FamilyTreeDNA’s current law enforcement guidelines require law 
enforcement to register the sample and request permission to use the 
platform, but does not require an official warrant to conduct genetic 
genealogy searches on the site.111 As of July 22, 2019, the FamilyTreeDNA 
database contained a total of 1,070,210 records.112 A recent survey conducted 
by Baylor University asked participants about law enforcement’s use of 
these databases.113 Of the 1,587 respondents, 91% supported the use of 
forensic genealogy for violent crimes, and 46% supported its use for 
nonviolent crimes.114 While the sample size was relatively small, the survey 
seems to reflect some level of societal acceptance for using genetic 
genealogical testing for crime fighting. 
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
A. Property Doctrine and Reasonable Expectations Analysis 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.115 
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The Fourth Amendment is the source of the United States’ privacy 
protections.116 As early as 1886, the Supreme Court has recognized the need 
to protect the “sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”117 The 
Fourth Amendment also establishes guidelines for law enforcement and 
police activity on both a state and federal level.118 The Fourth Amendment 
was constructed as a response against general “writs of assistance” 
common under British colonial rule that allowed British law enforcement 
to “draft assistance . . . and to search any place smuggled goods might be 
concealed.”119 In Boyd v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to “all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employees on the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”120 
Further, the Boyd Court interpreted the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in 
tandem stating: 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that 
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense . . . but 
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony, or of his 
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his 
goods, is within the condemnation of that judgement. In this regard the fourth 
and fifth amendments run almost into each other.121 
Boyd defined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in terms of an 
individual’s property interest.122 As America developed, the public demand 
for government control increased at the same time the fundamental right to 
privacy gained acceptance, and the impact of a strict interpretation of Boyd 
on the ability to acquire important evidence began to produce undesired 
results.123 As a result, Boyd’s property doctrine became less and less 
relevant.124 
In an effort to protect people and not just places, the Supreme Court 
shifted Fourth Amendment doctrine from a property tort-based approach in 
Boyd v. United States to a reasonable expectations analysis in Katz v. 
United States.125 Katz addressed Fourth Amendment concerns around 
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increasingly sophisticated government surveillance techniques.126 Katz 
explored whether the government could wiretap a telephone booth to 
record a defendant’s conversations without first obtaining a warrant. The 
Court held in favor of the defendant, and in Justice Harlan’s landmark 
concurrence, he defined a new standard for judging reasonable search and 
seizure.127 Justice Harlan stated, “the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”128 
The Court highlighted how advancing technology, such as electronic 
surveillance, “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while 
using a telephone booth, and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”129 
The reasonable expectations standard has continued to prevail in 
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but there is some division as to 
whether the Katz opinion effectively overruled Boyd’s property doctrine. 
United States v. Jones reinvigorated previously abandoned property interest 
rationales in 2012. In Jones, the Supreme Court stated that Katz did not 
replace traditional conceptions of Fourth Amendment protection and 
property interests.130 The Jones Court stated, “the Fourth Amendment was 
understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon 
the areas . . . it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding.”131 
The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.132 For the first time since 
Katz, the Court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment’s original 
protections of individual property interests were relevant. Jones indicated 
that while Fourth Amendment property doctrine was by no means a 
dominant force in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it may still be relevant 
in cases when the government interacts with individual property for the 
purposes of surveillance.133 
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B. Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine was first articulated in United States v. Miller 
as a way to clarify the reasonable expectations analysis established in 
Katz.134 Specifically, the court held that an individual loses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment when the individual 
volunteers information to a third party. In the case of Miller, the court 
refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a plaintiff’s bank 
records.135 Any question of whether the third-party doctrine would be a 
permanent staple in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was eliminated three 
years later when the Supreme Court handed down Smith v. Maryland. In 
this case, the government’s interception of a phone number dialed by the 
defendant using a pen register constituted a reasonable search under the 
Katz test because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he volunteered the information to the phone company.136 The Court 
explained, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.137 This rationale is 
based on the idea that when an individual assumes the risk in revealing his 
or her personal details to another person or entity, that information need not 
be privileged from government seizure.138 
The third-party doctrine has been repeatedly upheld with few limits 
until the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Carpenter v. United States. In 
Carpenter, the Court distinguished cell site location data from information 
affirmatively volunteered to third-parties encompassed in the third-party 
doctrine.139 The Court echoed sentiments raised in Jones, arguing that 
Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test does not supplant the basic 
principles that underpin the Fourth Amendment.140 The Carpenter Court 
reinvigorated originalist Fourth Amendment principles in stating the 
“central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance’” and “to secure ‘the privacies of life’ 
against ‘arbitrary power.’”141 Regarding affirmative consent, the Carpenter 
Court argued the cell phone has become ubiquitous to modern life, and 
users have no control over how their location data is used by third-party 
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cell phone companies.142 Stuck between the third-party doctrine articulated 
in Smith and Miller and the property interest doctrine reinvigorated in 
Jones, the Carpenter Court declined to apply the third-party doctrine to cell 
site location data, and indicated that it would be limited in cases where 
technological advancement had created a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and a lack of affirmative consent in how individual data would be used.143 
C. Fourth Amendment protections of biological property 
In 2013, the Supreme Court considered how much leeway the 
Constitution gives police to adopt new DNA technology for crime solving 
in Maryland v. King. In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested for first- and 
second-degree assault.144 “As part of a routine booking procedure,” his 
DNA was taken by cheek swab, known as a buccal swab, and entered into 
law enforcement’s CODIS system.145 His DNA matched the DNA taken 
from a rape victim in a case that had previously been unsolved.146 Alonzo 
King was subsequently charged and convicted of the rape. The case turned 
on whether the mandatory DNA collection constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure. In a close 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held against 
King, ruling when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause and 
bring that suspect into custody, analyzing a cheek swab is a legitimate 
booking procedure under the Fourth Amendment. 147 
The Court’s analysis followed the familiar balancing test framework 
that requires the court to balance the interests of the state against the 
privacy interests of the individual.148 The court analogized DNA collection 
to typical booking procedures such as fingerprinting that are used to 
identify the criminal and inform law enforcement of any past convictions.149 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, issued 
a poignant dissent, arguing the scope of the holding rested on an 
unenforceable principle.150 The dissent recognized that without concrete 
limiting principles, DNA identification would eventually be used to 
identify individuals for minor offenses such as traffic violations.151 The 
dissent also reasserted the purpose of the Fourth Amendment stating, “[t]he 
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Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime 
when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in 
possession of incriminating evidence. That prohibition is categorical and 
without exception . . . .”152 
Critics of the case argue that the King Court relied on the wrong line 
of cases by comparing DNA sampling to fingerprinting. A better 
comparison, one critic argues, was a line of cases involving the search of 
information on seized computers.153 “A search of someone’s DNA is unique 
with respect to the physical intrusion necessary to effectuate the search and 
the amount of data rendered by the search.”154 Especially when familial and 
genetic genealogical testing is considered, this type of testing reveals far 
more than mere identification.155 
VI. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN FORENSIC GENETIC GENEALOGICAL 
TESTING 
A. Legislative 
There is no national standard for familial DNA testing, but US 
prosecutors have looked to the United Kingdom’s DNA profiling system as 
a potential model for US enforcement.156 Twelve states currently authorize 
familial DNA testing, and two jurisdictions, Maryland and Washington, 
D.C., have specifically prohibited familial DNA testing.157 US jurisdictions 
typically impose strict requirements in order to use familial search.158 These 
requirements typically limit the use of familial searches to violent crimes 
that cause serious injury, death, or cases that present a “continuing threat of 
imminent and serious harm to the community, which remain unsolved after 
exhausting traditional investigative leads. . . .”159 Additionally, most states 
require a “sample requirement,” meaning that the unknown sample must be 
a complete profile from a single source.160 Finally, the familial search must 
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usually be approved by the state’s Attorney General, who signs off on the 
application and approves the case as qualifying for a familial search.161 
Familial DNA searches within the public databases are highly regulated 
and limited in their jurisdictional application. However, private commercial 
databases offer law enforcement the opportunity to leverage familial DNA 
searches without the same regulatory hurdles. 
If courts and privacy policies are not a viable way to challenge law 
enforcement access to consumer databases and genetic genealogical search, 
legislation will be a critical avenue for genetic privacy advocates.162 The 
rise of DNA big data and genetic genealogical testing raises issues around 
whether the US is adequately protecting consumers.163 Law professors, 
doctors, and other genomics experts have raised concerns that because 
laws regulating genetic privacy are varied across federal agencies and 
states, there is no guarantee of genetic anonymity.164 As a result, a group of 
advocates led by Professor Susan Wolf at the University of Minnesota 
have developed a public database for genomics law called LawSeq.165 The 
database compiles all federal and state laws, regulations, official guidance, 
and professional standards that regulate the field of genomics. The group 
is also working to make recommendations to policymakers on how to 
legislate around DNA data. 
B. Interim DOJ Guidance 
While the United States has reached some consensus on DNA data 
and health privacy, forensic searches are still varied depending on subject 
matter and location. In an effort to offer some standardization, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has released an interim policy that could help 
standardize how forensic genetic genealogical testing is handled in federal 
cases. Federal agencies are quickly adapting to the use of genetic 
genealogical search in criminal investigations. 
On November 11, 2019, the DOJ published an interim policy on the 
use of forensic genetic genealogical DNA analysis and searching in 
criminal investigations.166 The purpose of the policy is to promote reasoned 
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and responsible usage of the technology. The policy only applies to 
criminal investigations which the DOJ has exclusive or concurrent 
jurisdiction. First, the DOJ limits the use of genetic genealogy search to 
violent crime defined as homicide and sex crime.167 The sample must also 
be from a putative perpetrator. A “putative perpetrator” is defined by the 
DOJ as a “one or more criminal actors reasonably believed by investigators 
to be the source of, or a contributor to, a forensic sample deposited during, 
or incident to, the commission of a crime.”168 Law enforcement can also use 
genetic genealogical testing to identify unidentified human remains from 
suspected homicide cases.169 
Next, the DOJ imposes significant limitations on how the results of 
genetic genealogical search can be used. Matches can only be used as an 
investigative lead, and further investigation is needed to meet the 
requirements for an arrest.170 Genetic genealogical testing can only be used 
after other databases like CODIS have been searched and other traditional 
investigation methods have been deployed.171 
Further, law enforcement agencies are no longer permitted to act 
covertly when using public databases. They must identify themselves as 
law enforcement.172 When a database search and subsequent genealogical 
research reveals third parties not in the database with a closer genetic 
kinship to the sample DNA, law enforcement must seek informed consent 
before any samples are collected from third parties.173 
Finally, law enforcement is required to keep all data confidential. If a 
suspect is charged before genetic genealogical testing is complete, law 
enforcement is required to cease testing. If a suspect is charged with a 
crime after genetic genealogical testing is done, the investigative agency 
must request that all profiles and genetic information be removed from 
records and provided directly to the investigative agency so that they may 
be retained for prosecution and judicial proceedings.174 
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VII. ANALYSIS 
A. Warrantless Genetic Genealogical Search and the Fourth Amendment 
Under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test established in Katz 
and the updated third-party doctrine analysis defined in Carpenter, the 
Fourth Amendment offers no protection for suspects identified through 
genetic genealogical search. In Guilt by Genetic Association, Abrahamson 
argues that Carpenter holds the third-party doctrine will not be applied to 
information databases with a reach that could permit the government to 
surveil a vast majority of United States citizens.175 However, Carpenter’s 
holding seems to turn more critically on both the lack of affirmative 
consent in volunteering cell tower location data and the essentiality of 
smart phones to modern life. The case does not contemplate the scope of 
the government’s ability to surveil its citizens. Consumer DNA databases 
are easily distinguishable from the databases contemplated in Carpenter 
because users affirmatively volunteer their genetic information, whereas 
consumers do not affirmatively consent to giving cell phone location data 
to third parties.176 The affirmative consent issue in genetic genealogical 
search does have some differences than a typical third-party doctrine issue 
under Carpenter. The fact that individuals share similar sequences of DNA 
operates as a kind of loophole for the third-party doctrine because an 
individual may never consent to being identified in a consumer database, 
nor have a reasonable expectation that he might be identified. While this 
issue stands out as different than other third-party doctrine issues, Fourth 
Amendment protections will continue to fall away under Katz and the third-
party doctrine in genetic genealogical search without a different 
interpretation of the affirmative consent rule. 
Familial DNA testing has been in practice since 2008, and twelve of 
the most populous and racially diverse states currently allow it.177 Nearly all 
state policies impose limits on when familial DNA testing can be used.178 
Suspect DNA samples taken from violent crime scenes and entered into 
long range familial DNA searches are justified under the Fourth 
Amendment because there is a strong government interest in public safety. 
This interest is affirmed in cases such as Maryland v. King where the Court 
identified a governmental interest in the identification of suspects brought 
into custody under probable cause. Furthermore, familial DNA searches 
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rarely reveal direct matches. The technique simply serves to narrow the 
field of suspects, and more traditional investigative work is required to 
criminally charge a suspect. 
A traditional reading of Boyd may offer Fourth Amendment protection 
against warrantless genetic genealogical search, but modern case law has 
not embraced a stricter reading of Boyd. Under Boyd, the Fourth 
Amendment protects an individual’s “indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property.”179 It might be argued under 
Boyd that an individual’s sense of personal security is violated through 
genetic genealogical search. Individuals have no control over their 
relative’s choice to submit their DNA to a database, and this lack of control 
over one’s own property interest and the state’s ability to identify a specific 
individual may violate a reasonable expectation of personal security. 
Jones is the most recent case to reinvigorate originalist definitions of 
privacy established in Boyd by suggesting that the Fourth Amendment 
should be understood as the “preservation of th[e] degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”180 
Jones held that a GPS tracking device installed on the bottom of a suspect’s 
vehicle constituted an unlawful warrantless search of a citizen’s property. 
The Court characterized the GPS tracking device as the government 
“physically occup[ying] private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.”181 There is no direct application of Jones to warrantless 
genetic genealogical database searches, but it elevated Boyd’s concept of 
property rights in the analysis of Fourth Amendment protections. 
In Maryland v. King, the Court categorized DNA as a type of personal 
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.182 This 
categorization is best applied under Jones within the context of DNA 
seized at crime scenes. DNA and other biological property left at crime 
scenes is no longer protected under the Fourth Amendment once there is a 
warrant to investigate and collect evidence at a crime scene. When 
characterized this way, the process of genetic genealogical search operates 
the same way as using any kind of evidence to narrow potential 
perpetrators. Genetic genealogical search narrows the pool of potential 
suspects using the suspect DNA extracted as evidence from the crime 
scene. Law enforcement must go beyond genetic genealogical search using 
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other tactics such as extracting suspect DNA from abandoned property to 
match the cold case DNA to a potential suspect. 
B. Forensic DNA extraction from abandoned property 
Genetic genealogical search has one powerful limitation: Its purpose 
is not to identify a suspect. It can only narrow the suspect pool to familial 
connections. In every case where genetic genealogical testing was used, 
suspect identification required law enforcement to extract DNA from 
abandoned or unattended property belonging to the suspect. In many of the 
cases, no warrant was required to extract the DNA. The Supreme Court has 
never ruled on whether DNA extracted from trash requires a warrant. This 
aspect of genetic genealogical search technique is the most susceptible to a 
possible Fourth Amendment violation. In California v. Greenwood, the 
Court argued “[t]he warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags 
left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth 
Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”183 
Under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, the Court heavily relied 
on both Smith and Katz to establish that it was custom to hand over 
garbage to a third party, and even allow third parties to take ownership 
over that garbage. For this reason, the discarding of garbage on the curb 
is protected under the third-party doctrine and removes any reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
The extraction of highly personal, private information found on the 
human genome can be distinguished from the types of evidence the court 
considered acceptable in Greenwood. At one point, the Court stated, 
“police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of 
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the 
public. Hence, ‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.’”184 Like cell site location data, DNA matter, even when 
discarded, is not something individuals knowingly and voluntarily display 
to the public. There is an expectation that our genetic information and 
everything contained within it is sensitive, private, and not accessible to the 
average citizen. DNA is invisible to the naked eye, and impossible to 
decode without sophisticated technology. Therefore, under a Carpenter 
third-party doctrine analysis, DNA extraction from suspect trash may be 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. Similar to cellular location data, it 
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 184  Id. at 41 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).  
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is impossible for humans to choose whether their DNA is left in trash. 
DNA falls off of humans every minute of every day, yet we retain the 
reasonable expectation that this aspect of our lives be kept private. There is 
a lack of voluntariness in DNA found within trash that is sufficient to be 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
Jones is not directly on point in addressing the issue of DNA extracted 
from suspect trash. Trash by definition assumes discarded property is no 
longer under the ownership of the individual. However, DNA is a form of 
biological property, and because DNA is an extension of an individual’s 
personhood, it could be argued under Jones that DNA ceases to become 
trash when it is separated from discarded objects and becomes an 
individual’s private property interest protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
While leveraging familial DNA search techniques in public DNA 
databases clearly falls outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, 
the investigative practice of identifying a suspect through genetic 
genealogical search and subsequently warrantlessly extracting suspect 
DNA from abandoned or unattended property does trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections under a Carpenter third-party doctrine analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Technological innovation has dramatically shifted what society 
considers private and how personal information is shared, but the core 
intent of the Fourth Amendment remains. It protects people from 
unreasonable search and seizure, but it does not protect people from lack of 
foresight in when they choose to share their data and personal information 
on the internet. Sharing genetic information for the express purpose of 
being found by family members in public DNA databases forecloses the 
possibility of Fourth Amendment protections under the third-party doctrine, 
all but securing a searchable genetic panopticon built by a civilian 
population without any help from the state. While the Fourth Amendment 
should protect against the extraction of DNA from trash or abandoned 
property after a genetic genealogical search has taken place, our society is 
still tasked with reconciling how our legislatures will protect our own 
privacy interests in an age where our DNA is no longer anonymous. 
